Encyclopaedia / Research guide

Quantitative Tightening & Bond Term Premium

Explore how central-bank asset runoff, duration supply, reserve conditions and term-premium estimates influence government-bond yields, money markets and wider financial conditions.

Deep Dive24 research modulesLast reviewed 12 November 2026Equations · Examples · Sources

1. What quantitative tightening means

Quantitative tightening (QT) is the reduction of securities or other assets held by a central bank, usually through the non-reinvestment of principal payments, active asset sales, or a combination of both. When securities mature and are not fully replaced, the central bank's portfolio becomes smaller. When assets are sold, the private sector must finance the purchase and hold the securities that the central bank previously owned.

QT is often described as the reverse of quantitative easing (QE), but the two processes are not exact mirror images. They can occur in different market environments, at different speeds and under different reserve-management frameworks. The effect of a given amount of runoff depends on the securities involved, their remaining duration, the maturity of government debt being issued, the capacity of private investors to absorb risk and the demand for central-bank liabilities.

The central questions are therefore not simply how much the balance sheet shrinks, but which assets leave, which investors absorb the resulting duration, what happens to reserves and money-market conditions, and how those changes affect the expected path of interest rates and the compensation investors require for holding longer-term bonds.

2. The central-bank balance sheet behind QT

A central bank's balance sheet contains assets and liabilities. Common assets include government bonds, agency debt, mortgage-backed securities, loans to financial institutions, foreign reserves and other claims. Common liabilities include bank reserve balances, banknotes in circulation, government deposits and reverse-repurchase liabilities.

The accounting identity is:

\text{Assets}=\text{Liabilities}+\text{Capital}

When a central bank reduces its securities holdings, the balance sheet must adjust through its liabilities, capital or other asset positions. In a conventional runoff operation, bank reserves often decline, but the change in reserves is not necessarily equal to the reduction in securities holdings. Other liabilities can move at the same time.

For example, a rise in the Treasury General Account (TGA) absorbs reserves because government cash is transferred from the banking system to the central bank. A fall in the TGA releases reserves back into the banking system. Currency demand, overnight reverse-repurchase balances, lending facilities and other balance-sheet items also affect the result.

The Federal Reserve explains that reducing securities holdings generally leads to lower reserve balances when other non-reserve liabilities do not change, while the actual outcome depends on the balance-sheet items moving alongside the runoff. Its balance-sheet policy questions and answers describe this accounting relationship.

3. Passive runoff: allowing securities to mature

The most common form of QT is passive runoff. A central bank receives principal when a bond matures or when a mortgage-backed security returns principal through scheduled amortisation or early repayment. Instead of reinvesting all of that principal, the central bank allows part of the portfolio to decline.

A monthly redemption cap limits how much principal is allowed to run off. If principal payments exceed the cap, the excess is reinvested. If principal payments are below the cap, the portfolio runs off by the smaller amount actually received.

For a simplified programme:

\text{Runoff}_t=\min(P_t,C_t)
\text{Reinvestment}_t=\max(P_t-C_t,0)

where $P_t$ is the principal payment received during the period and $C_t$ is the applicable redemption cap. The exact implementation depends on the central bank's published rules and the asset class involved.

The Federal Reserve's May 2022 plan used this approach for Treasury securities and agency debt and mortgage-backed securities. The initial monthly caps were \$30 billion for Treasuries and \$17.5 billion for agency securities, rising after three months to \$60 billion and \$35 billion respectively. These were maximum runoff amounts, not promises that the full cap would be reached every month. The FOMC's published runoff plan sets out the operational framework.

4. Active sales and the importance of market functioning

Active sales differ from passive runoff because the central bank offers securities for sale before maturity. Sales can accelerate the reduction in holdings and change the amount, maturity and timing of securities that private investors must absorb.

The distinction matters for market functioning. A predictable maturity schedule gives investors time to plan for a known flow of supply. Large or concentrated sales can create a more immediate demand for dealer balance-sheet capacity and investor risk appetite, particularly in less liquid maturity segments.

Sales also transfer duration risk at the point of execution. Their impact depends on the size of the operation relative to normal market turnover, the maturity and liquidity of the securities, the investor base, dealer intermediation capacity and whether other issuers are supplying similar duration at the same time.

The Bank of England has explicitly stated that its gilt sales should be gradual and predictable and should not disrupt market functioning. Its September 2026 decision also considered whether part of the unwind could be implemented through sales to the UK Debt Management Office rather than through ordinary market auctions. The September 2026 MPC minutes explain the market-functioning principles behind that decision.

5. QE, QT, reinvestment and reserve-management purchases

QE and QT affect the private sector's holdings of securities and the central bank's balance sheet, but they should not be treated as mechanically symmetrical.

Under QE, a central bank buys securities from the market. The seller receives a deposit or other settlement asset, while the banking system receives reserve balances through the settlement process. The central bank removes some duration and interest-rate risk from private portfolios and may reduce the term premium by changing the supply of longer-term securities available to investors.

Under QT, the central bank allows securities to mature without full reinvestment or sells them. Private investors must absorb more of the securities or duration that the central bank no longer holds. The process can put upward pressure on term premia, all else equal, but the outcome depends on investor demand and the wider supply of debt.

Reinvestment is different from a new reserve-management purchase. Reinvesting principal from a maturing security replaces one asset with another and may preserve the size of a portfolio or change its composition. A reserve-management purchase is intended to maintain sufficient central-bank reserves for the operating framework, not necessarily to provide additional monetary-policy accommodation.

The Federal Reserve's December 2025 implementation instructions illustrate the distinction: Treasury principal payments were to be rolled over at auction, while principal payments from agency securities were to be reinvested in Treasury bills. The FOMC also authorised shorter-term Treasury purchases when needed to maintain ample reserves. These are separate operational decisions, even though they can all involve Treasury purchases. See the December 2025 FOMC statement and the New York Fed's explanation of reserve-management purchases.

6. The yield curve and the term premium

A longer-term government-bond yield can be understood as the combination of the expected path of future short-term interest rates and a term premium. In simplified form:

y_{n,t}=\frac{1}{n}\sum_{j=0}^{n-1}E_t(r_{t+j})+TP_{n,t}

where $y_{n,t}$ is the yield on a bond with maturity $n$, the expectation term represents the average future short rate over the bond's life, and $TP_{n,t}$ is the term premium.

The term premium is the additional compensation investors require for holding a longer-maturity bond rather than repeatedly investing in shorter-term instruments. The compensation reflects uncertainty about future interest rates and can also be influenced by inflation risk, liquidity, supply, investor preferences, market structure and the risk-bearing capacity of intermediaries.

The term premium is not directly observable. It must be estimated using a model or inferred from survey expectations and market yields. A ten-year yield can therefore rise even when expected future short rates are unchanged or falling, if the estimated term premium increases by more than the expectations component declines.

The New York Fed's Treasury Term Premia data provide estimates from the Adrian, Crump and Moench (ACM) model, including fitted yields and expected average short rates. The estimates are model-based and are not official policy forecasts.

7. Why term-premium estimates differ

Different models can produce different estimates because they use different assumptions, factors, data inputs and definitions. The ACM model uses a five-factor no-arbitrage term-structure framework. Other approaches use survey expectations, alternative factor structures or different treatments of inflation and liquidity risk.

The Federal Reserve Board's yield-curve models and data include model-based decompositions of nominal yields into expected short-rate and term-premium components. The Board notes that these are staff research products rather than official statistical releases and can be revised or changed as methods evolve.

Some model definitions include a convexity component within the term premium, while others attempt to isolate compensation for interest-rate risk more narrowly. Recent research has also examined whether investors demand compensation for providing term funding even when they hedge much of the direct interest-rate exposure. The Dallas Fed's 2026 discussion of the term-funding premium is one example of this debate.

A term-premium estimate should therefore be read as a model-dependent analytical measure, not as a directly quoted market price or a complete explanation of why a bond yield moved.

8. The portfolio-balance channel and preferred habitat

The portfolio-balance channel describes how changes in the quantity and composition of securities available to private investors can influence their prices and yields. If a central bank removes a substantial amount of long-duration government debt from the market, investors may accept lower yields because less duration risk remains for them to hold.

When the central bank reduces its holdings, the private sector must absorb more of that risk. Investors may require a higher yield to hold the additional duration, particularly if their risk budgets are constrained or if competing assets offer more attractive returns.

The preferred-habitat idea adds that investors often have maturity preferences. Pension funds, insurers, banks, money-market funds, foreign reserve managers and leveraged investors do not all treat every maturity as a perfect substitute. A change in the supply of ten-year bonds may therefore affect the ten-year sector differently from the two-year or thirty-year sectors.

The effect is not guaranteed. If demand is strong, other investors may absorb the additional supply with little change in yields. If the market is already dealing with heavy issuance, elevated volatility or limited dealer capacity, the same amount of additional duration can have a larger price effect.

9. Measuring duration supply and DV01

The face value of securities running off is not a complete measure of the interest-rate risk transferred to investors. A short-dated bill and a long-dated bond with the same face value have very different sensitivity to yield changes.

Modified duration provides a first-order measure of the percentage price sensitivity of a bond to a small change in yield. DV01, also called dollar value of a basis point, converts that sensitivity into a currency amount.

DV01\approx MV\times D_{mod}\times0.0001

where $MV$ is market value and $D_{mod}$ is modified duration. The approximation assumes a small parallel yield move and ignores convexity and other nonlinear effects.

A maturity-weighted supply measure is therefore more informative than a simple comparison of face values. Analysts can compare the DV01 of securities leaving the central bank's portfolio with the DV01 of securities being issued or absorbed by other investors. This does not produce a perfect forecast of yields, but it helps quantify the amount of interest-rate risk that needs to be held somewhere in the market.

10. QT and government borrowing are different sources of supply

Government debt issuance and central-bank portfolio runoff both affect the amount of securities that private investors may need to hold, but they arise from different decisions.

The Treasury issues debt to finance government cash requirements and manage its debt portfolio. The central bank changes its securities holdings to implement monetary policy or maintain its operating framework. A Treasury auction schedule and a central-bank runoff schedule should therefore be analysed separately before their combined market impact is assessed.

Net issuance alone can also be misleading. Maturity, coupon structure, duration, buybacks, foreign demand, bank holdings, pension and insurance demand, and the central bank's reinvestment policy all affect the amount of risk the market must absorb.

The U.S. Treasury describes its debt-management objective as financing the government at the lowest cost over time while issuing debt in a regular and predictable manner. Its financing and quarterly-refunding process provides the institutional context for understanding how government supply decisions are communicated.

11. Reserve balances, ample reserves and money-market conditions

QT can affect financial markets through the supply of reserves as well as through the amount of duration held by private investors. These channels are related but distinct.

In an abundant-reserves framework, the banking system holds more reserves than it needs for smooth payment and rate-control operations. In an ample-reserves framework, the central bank supplies enough reserves for administered rates to control short-term money-market rates without having to fine-tune reserve quantities each day. In a scarce-reserves framework, small changes in reserve supply can have a much larger effect on overnight funding rates.

The level of reserves consistent with an ample system is not a fixed number. It depends on bank balance sheets, payment flows, liquidity regulation, the availability of alternative high-quality liquid assets, money-market funds and the capacity of repo markets to redistribute liquidity.

The Bank for International Settlements' 2026 research on reserve demand finds that liquidity regulation and other institutional frictions can reshape the reserve-demand relationship rather than simply shift it by a fixed amount. The BIS study on central-bank reserve demand is useful when assessing how far a central bank can reduce its balance sheet without creating money-market stress.

12. The TGA, overnight reverse repos and repo-market capacity

A central bank's reserve supply is affected by more than securities runoff. Government cash balances, currency demand, overnight reverse-repurchase facilities and other liabilities can move independently.

When the Treasury builds its account at the Federal Reserve, bank reserves tend to decline as funds move into the government's account. When the Treasury spends those funds, reserves tend to return to the banking system. A reduction in overnight reverse-repurchase balances can also change the distribution of cash between money-market funds and banks.

Repo markets provide secured short-term funding against collateral. If dealers or other intermediaries have limited balance-sheet capacity, additional Treasury supply can create funding pressure even when the aggregate reserve balance appears large.

A 2026 Federal Reserve research paper argues that repo-market capacity can be an important constraint on the size of the central bank's balance sheet and that the interaction between policy rates and balance-sheet policy can be more complex than a simple reserve-demand story. The Federal Reserve study on the balance sheet and repo market examines this channel.

13. QT and the policy interest rate are separate instruments

The policy rate primarily influences the price of short-term money and the expected path of future short-term rates. Balance-sheet policy changes the central bank's holdings of securities, the distribution of duration risk and, depending on the operating framework, the supply of reserves.

A central bank can therefore reduce its policy rate while continuing to shrink its balance sheet. It can also stop runoff while maintaining a restrictive policy rate. Neither combination is inherently contradictory.

The Federal Reserve's January 2022 principles state that changes in the federal funds target range are its primary means of adjusting the monetary-policy stance. The Bank of England reiterated in September 2026 that Bank Rate is its active policy tool when adjusting the stance of monetary policy, while gilt sales should be conducted gradually and without disrupting market functioning.

The correct interpretation separates the policy-rate decision, the expected future policy path, balance-sheet operations and reserve-management decisions. Treating all four as one signal can lead to incorrect conclusions about whether policy is tightening or easing.

14. How QT can influence the shape of the yield curve

If QT increases the amount of long-duration securities that private investors must absorb, it can put upward pressure on long-term term premia. If short-term policy-rate expectations remain stable, the yield curve may steepen at the long end.

A bear steepening occurs when longer-term yields rise more than shorter-term yields. QT can contribute to that outcome, but it is not the only possible cause. Higher fiscal issuance, inflation uncertainty, changes in global savings, shifts in foreign demand and a repricing of expected growth can produce similar movements.

A bull steepening, in which short-term yields fall faster than long-term yields, can also occur while QT is under way. In that case, the market may be pricing future policy-rate cuts even as the term premium remains elevated.

The yield curve should therefore be decomposed into expected short rates and term premium before attributing a move to QT. A rising ten-year yield alone does not establish that balance-sheet runoff is the cause.

15. Transmission to mortgages, corporate borrowing, equities and currencies

Long-term government-bond yields influence a wide range of financial prices, but the transmission differs across markets.

  • Mortgages: Higher long-term yields can raise fixed mortgage rates. For mortgage-backed securities, prepayment uncertainty and negative convexity can make duration change as interest rates move.
  • Corporate bonds: Government yields form a reference rate, while corporate spreads reflect credit, liquidity and other risk premia. A rise in government yields can raise total borrowing costs even if credit spreads are unchanged.
  • Equities: Higher discount rates can reduce the present value of distant expected cash flows, particularly for companies whose valuations depend heavily on future growth. The effect also depends on earnings expectations and risk premia.
  • Foreign exchange: Relative yields can influence currency demand, but exchange rates also respond to expected policy, growth, risk appetite, capital flows and hedging costs.
  • Banks and financial intermediaries: Changes in reserves, deposit funding, collateral values and bond portfolios can affect liquidity and balance-sheet management.

The same QT operation can therefore have different effects across assets. It may raise the term premium while corporate spreads narrow, or it may coincide with falling equity prices because expected earnings deteriorate. Cross-asset confirmation is useful, but no single market move identifies QT as the cause.

16. How to monitor QT and term-premium conditions

A disciplined assessment combines central-bank portfolio data, government issuance, reserve indicators and bond-market pricing.

QuestionUseful evidenceWhat it helps establish
Is the central bank reducing holdings?Securities holdings, maturities, reinvestment caps and sales schedulesThe pace and composition of portfolio reduction
How much duration is returning to the market?Maturity profile, modified duration and DV01The interest-rate risk that private investors must absorb
Is government supply also rising?Net issuance, auction sizes, buybacks and maturity mixThe combined supply pressure from fiscal and central-bank decisions
Are reserves becoming less abundant?Reserve balances, TGA, overnight reverse repos and standing repo usageThe condition of the short-term funding system
Is the long-end move driven by expectations or term premium?Model-based term-premium estimates and survey expectationsA decomposition of the yield change
Is market functioning deteriorating?Repo rates, bid-ask spreads, auction tails and market depthWhether the market is absorbing supply smoothly

For U.S. analysis, the Federal Reserve's H.4.1 release reports reserve balances and balance-sheet items. The New York Fed's Treasury securities operational details provide purchase schedules and operational results. These series should be read with their publication dates, observation periods and units.

17. Worked example: applying a runoff cap

Assume a central bank receives \$82 billion in principal payments during a month and the applicable runoff cap is \$60 billion.

\text{Runoff}=\min(82,60)=\$60\text{bn}
\text{Reinvestment}=\max(82-60,0)=\$22\text{bn}

The portfolio declines by \$60 billion, while \$22 billion of principal is reinvested. The example illustrates a cap-based runoff rule; it does not describe an actual central-bank monthly observation.

If principal payments were only \$45 billion, the portfolio would decline by \$45 billion rather than \$60 billion. A cap is a maximum permitted runoff amount, not a guaranteed monthly reduction.

18. Worked example: comparing duration supply

Suppose a central bank allows \$100 billion of bonds with a modified duration of 7.0 years to run off. The approximate DV01 transferred to private investors is:

DV01=100\text{bn}\times7.0\times0.0001=\$70\text{m per bp}

Now suppose a ten-year benchmark bond has a modified duration of 8.5 years. The notional amount of that benchmark with approximately the same DV01 is:

\text{Equivalent notional}=\frac{100\times7.0}{8.5}=\$82.35\text{bn}

The \$100 billion portfolio runoff therefore carries approximately the same first-order parallel-rate sensitivity as \$82.35 billion of the assumed ten-year benchmark. The calculation is an illustrative duration comparison. It ignores convexity, key-rate exposures, security-specific liquidity and changes in duration as yields move.

19. Worked example: separating expected rates from term premium

Assume a ten-year government-bond yield is initially 4.20%, comprising an expected average short-rate component of 3.60% and a term premium of 0.60%.

Later, the expected average short-rate component falls to 3.55%, but the term premium rises to 0.90%.

The new ten-year yield is:

3.55\%+0.90\%=4.45\%

The ten-year yield has risen by 25 basis points even though the expected average short rate has fallen by 5 basis points. The term premium has increased by 30 basis points and more than offset the decline in the expectations component.

This is one reason a long-term yield can rise while markets are pricing future policy-rate cuts. The example is hypothetical and demonstrates the arithmetic of a yield decomposition, not a forecast or a published market observation.

20. Worked example: why reserves do not have to fall one-for-one

Consider a simplified central-bank balance sheet in which securities assets decline by \$100 billion. At the same time, currency in circulation increases by \$20 billion, the government's deposit falls by \$40 billion and overnight reverse-repurchase liabilities fall by \$30 billion. Assume capital and all other balance-sheet items are unchanged.

The change in reserve balances must reconcile the asset and liability movements:

\Delta R=\Delta A-\Delta C-\Delta TGA-\Delta ONRRP
\Delta R=-100-20-(-40)-(-30)=-\$50\text{bn}

Reserves decline by \$50 billion, not \$100 billion. The example shows why securities runoff and reserve changes should be monitored separately. The figures are illustrative and use the central-bank balance-sheet identity.

21. International comparison: the position in November 2026

QT is not a single global programme. The operating framework, maturity profile and current phase differ across central banks.

Federal Reserve. The FOMC concluded the securities-runoff programme on 1 December 2025 after judging that reserve balances had declined to ample levels. It then authorised purchases of shorter-term Treasury securities when needed to maintain ample reserves. For the monthly period from 15 October to 13 November 2026, the New York Fed's operational schedule showed approximately \$14.6 billion of reinvestment purchases and no reserve-management purchases. These reinvestment purchases should not be confused with a new QT programme or with additional reserve-management purchases. The current operational schedule is the appropriate source for the latest period.

The H.4.1 release dated 5 November 2026 reported reserve balances of approximately \$2.930 trillion for the week ended 4 November, a Treasury General Account balance of approximately \$957 billion and securities held outright of approximately \$6.464 trillion. These are dated balance-sheet observations, not a stand-alone measure of the monetary-policy stance.

Bank of England. At its September 2026 meeting, the MPC set a multi-year path to unwind £368 billion of gilts held for monetary-policy purposes by the end of 2034. The plan combines annual sales of £20 billion with maturities, producing an average annual reduction of approximately £46 billion. The Bank also set aside £120 billion of the longest-dated gilts to back current and future banknote issuance; £222 billion of other gilts were to be held to maturity and £146 billion was identified for sale. The operational route for some sales was still being considered, including potential sales to the Debt Management Office. The Bank's 2026 Q3 Asset Purchase Facility report and September MPC decision provide the dated detail.

The Bank's September minutes also noted that UK long-term term premia had risen by an estimated 200 basis points since QT began in February 2022, while identifying global policy uncertainty, high government-bond issuance across countries and structural changes in demand for long-dated UK debt as important contributors. That is a useful reminder that a rise in term premium during QT is not proof that QT alone caused the move.

European Central Bank. The Eurosystem stopped reinvesting maturing APP principal from July 2023 and fully discontinued PEPP reinvestments at the end of 2024. The portfolios continue to decline as securities mature. The ECB's APP data and PEPP programme information explain the different programme timelines.

22. What the empirical evidence can and cannot establish

Research supports the idea that central-bank asset purchases and balance-sheet reductions can influence bond-market pricing and corporate financing through maturity-specific supply and portfolio channels. It does not establish a universal coefficient that converts a fixed amount of QT into a predictable number of basis points.

A 2025 Bank for International Settlements working paper examines maturity-specific Federal Reserve balance-sheet shocks across QE and QT programmes from 2011 to 2024. It finds that bond markets are an important transmission channel and that effects differ across firms, maturity segments and credit quality. Its findings should be interpreted within the paper's research design rather than as a simple rule that QT produces the exact opposite of QE. See How Do Quantitative Easing and Tightening Affect Firms?.

Other research highlights the importance of reserve demand, repo-market capacity and the ability of private investors to absorb government debt. These factors can change over time. The relationship between balance-sheet size, reserves and funding conditions is therefore regime-dependent, not a fixed mechanical relationship.

A useful empirical question is whether a yield move coincides with a change in expected short rates, term-premium estimates, net duration supply, reserve conditions and market liquidity. If several channels move together, the analyst should still distinguish correlation from causal attribution.

23. Common analytical errors and a practical reading framework

Several shortcuts can produce misleading interpretations:

  • “QT always pushes long yields higher.” QT can increase private duration supply, but yields also depend on expected policy rates, inflation, fiscal supply, risk appetite and investor demand.
  • “The central bank sells every bond that runs off.” Passive runoff generally allows maturities or principal payments to reduce holdings; active sales are a separate operation.
  • “Reserves fall by the same amount as securities holdings.” Other liabilities, including government deposits and reverse-repurchase balances, can change at the same time.
  • “QT and a rate hike are the same policy signal.” The policy rate and balance-sheet tools operate through different channels and can move in different directions.
  • “The term premium is directly observable.” It is estimated using models or survey-based methods, and estimates differ by methodology.
  • “A rising term premium proves QT caused the move.” Fiscal issuance, uncertainty, liquidity and structural demand can contribute to the same result.
  • “Every central bank is still doing QT.” The Federal Reserve, Bank of England and Eurosystem illustrate different operational stages and objectives.

A robust interpretation follows a sequence: identify the central bank's actual instruction; measure the asset and maturity change; assess the duration returning to private investors; check government issuance and investor demand; examine reserves and money-market conditions; decompose long yields into expectations and term premium; and then test whether the move is visible in mortgages, credit, equities or currencies.

24. Analytical exercises, sources and related concepts

Exercise 1 — Runoff cap

A central bank receives \$95 billion of principal payments and has a \$70 billion monthly runoff cap. Calculate the runoff and reinvestment amounts.

Answer: Runoff is \$70 billion and reinvestment is \$25 billion.

Exercise 2 — Duration supply

A \$60 billion portfolio has a modified duration of 6.0 years. Estimate its DV01.

Answer: \$60 billion × 6.0 × 0.0001 = approximately \$36 million per basis point.

Exercise 3 — Yield decomposition

A ten-year yield rises from 4.00% to 4.20%. The expected average short-rate component falls from 3.50% to 3.45%. What happened to the term premium?

Answer: The initial term premium was 0.50%; the new term premium is 0.75%. It increased by 25 basis points, more than offsetting the 5-basis-point fall in the expected short-rate component.

Exercise 4 — Reserve accounting

Securities assets decline by \$80 billion. Currency rises by \$10 billion, the TGA falls by \$30 billion and overnight reverse-repurchase liabilities fall by \$20 billion. Assuming all other items are unchanged, calculate the reserve change.

Answer: \$\\Delta R=-80-10-(-30)-(-20)=-\$40 billion. Reserve balances decline by \$40 billion.

Primary institutional and research sources

Related concepts

Continue with Basis Point, U.S. Treasury Yields & Equity Valuation, U.S. Treasury Yield Curve, Curve Shape & Bear Steepening, Major Central Banks — Mandates, Reaction Functions & Forward Guidance and Market Regimes & Cross-Asset Confirmation.